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Abstract 
Before you lies the dissertation ‘Renewable energy support mechanisms and 
environmental policy in the EU’. It has been written to fulfill the requirements of the MSc in 
Energy Law, Business, Regulation and Policy at the International Hellenic University. I was 
engaged in writing this dissertation from October 2018 to February 2019.  
 Through our courses of the MSc program, we often came across with various Directives 
concerning aspects of commercial energy activities such as trade, transit, investments and also 
energy efficiency. Apart from this, some of us chose a coursework about renewable energy 
support schemes across Europe for the course ‘’Energy Law II’’. As a result, I was intrigued to 
delve into the legal framework about energy. In addition, as we have already entered to an era 
that renewable energy is crucial to the planet’s survival and the fact that my Bachelor’s degree 
is in Economics, I felt the need to study further the support schemes of renewable energy in the 
European Union.         
 Concerning the renewable energy support mechanisms, the following key points are 
going to be examined: Feed-in tariffs, Feed-in premiums, Quota obligations with tradable green 
certificates, Loan guarantees, Soft loans, Investment grants, and Tax incentives. Also, we are 
going to delve into the European Union’s 2020 target, i.e. a 20% share of energy from 
renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption in 2020, as set in the 2008 decided 
package of energy and climate change legislation.     
 Concerning the environmental policy in the European Union, the following key points 
are going to be examined: Framework, Climate change, Air and noise pollution, Green growth, 
Agriculture, Eco-innovation and the EU’s Environment Action Programme (EAP) until 2020. 
Since the European environmental law contains a steadily growing number of Directives and 
Regulations, the Commission seems to be focusing more and more on the Framework 
Directives, which integrate the more specific pieces of legislation from the past.  
 I would like to thank my supervisor for her excellent guidance and support during this 
process. I also wish to thank my family and friends for their support and counsel. The library 
staff at the International Hellenic University also deserves thanks for their assistance and 
cooperation in providing me with relevant materials for the thesis and assisting me whenever I 
needed help. 
Keywords: support schemes, support mechanisms, renewable energy, environmental policy, 
feed-in-tariffs 
 
Dimitrios Vouropoulos 
8/2/2019 
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Introduction 
 During the last few years, environmental policies at the global, national and local levels 
have undergone profound changes. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, there is a shift of 
concern from local pollution problems towards global long-term issues like climate change, 
depletion of freshwater reserves, etc. At the same time, environmental protection is being seen 
not only as an obligation but also as an opportunity. The European Union (EU) is trying to deal 
with the continuous challenges by introducing an innovative approach to environmental policy. 
This is achieved with the integration of environmental consideration into other policies and the 
variety of environmental instruments, in order to improve both the effectiveness and efficiency 
of environmental management. However, the biggest challenge has been to increase the 
competitiveness of European industry while protecting the environment.  
 Environmental policies can only be effective if there is a proper collaboration between 
the regulators and the regulated. For this interaction to be successful, it is vital to create the 
right environmental regulatory framework. Traditionally, the economic analysis of an 
environmental policy focuses on its effects. The whole process involves monitoring of the 
environmental regulations and how they affect technological changes, competition among 
companies, employment and economic growth. Most of the results lead to the implementation 
of instruments such as taxes and tradable permits.     
 Environmental policies include various stages. At first, there is a phase of dialogue and 
negotiations between public authorities, regulators and the interested parties. In this context, 
the Commission emphasizes on the collaboration and right interaction among the various 
actors (government, companies, consumers). In addition, EU member states promote the use of 
stakeholder consultation and intervention in the development of new environmental 
instruments. Also, a good relationship among all interested parties is substantial for the proper 
implementation of the policies.       
 Another factor that should be taken into consideration is that institutions and regulatory 
methods are constantly changing. The Act of Political Union signed in 1992 has been the first 
step towards an improved environmental law-making in the EU. Majority among member 
states is introduced for the decision making, instead of unanimity and the role of the European 
Parliament (EP) is strengthened. During the years, it is observed that the EU imitates the other 
OECD countries when it comes to new policy instruments. Moreover, environmental taxation is 
being adopted by many member states as well as the use of voluntary agreements between 
companies and governments.       
 Companies play a significant role in the regulatory process. Of course this is the result of 
endorsement and encouragement from various policy makers. Most of the information 
regarding the amount of pollution, abatements costs and technology is only known by 
companies. Consequently, the regulators have to collect the data before trying to reduce 
pollution. Also, it is often observed that firms undertake lobbying activities before any 
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proposals are drafted by the government.       
 It should be noted that sometimes regulations are subject to failure. Environmental 
economics is very marked with Pigou’s concept of externality, which is linked directly to market 
failure. This induces many environmental economists to seek public intervention. Even 
regulators can fail - willingly or unwillingly. This can be caused by lack of information, personal 
interests or false predictions. However, public intervention to fix the externalities is only 
meaningful when market failures exceed regulatory failures. Finally, the commonly considered 
market structure is the model of perfect competition. The introduction of new environmental 
regulations should not create disparities in competition among companies.  
 The 2030 legal framework for energy and climate sets new policy objectives and EU-
wide targets for reaching to a more efficient and competitive energy system. Also, it paves the 
way for Europe’s goal of a low carbon economy. Together with the targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction and energy savings increase, another aim of this policy framework is to 
achieve a minimum 27% of renewable energy in Europe’s final energy consumption. With the 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED) already into force (and its target for 2020), EU member 
states are now focusing towards the next decade and its objectives.   
 In this context, support mechanism for renewable energy sources (RES) are a key factor 
for the fulfillment of national and European renewables objectives. In order to prevent any 
mischiefs that may derive from public support granted to RES, the Commission has decreed 
specific Guidelines concerning state aid for environmental protection and energy. Due to this 
predicament, member states are now obliged to adopt their national schemes, stirring up a 
high level of interest when it comes to the various implementation approaches and the overall 
costs for RES deployment in the EU.        
 RES policies can influence consumers in many ways. The final cost of achieving the 
defined goals, will most likely burden the end-users, whether it has the form of electricity bills 
or higher electricity prices. So, it is essential for the consumers that RES are properly and 
efficiently exploited. 
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Environmental policy in the EU 
 
Organisational structures 
When the EU was created, a group of like-minded states tried to address their common 
problems more effectively by working together following two world wars. However, when some 
of them realized the benefits of this collaboration, they became hesitant about surrendering 
their sovereignty to a multinational entity. As a result, the EU is considered to be a combination 
of intergoverntalism and supranationalism. In certain policy areas, EU operates as a pseudo-
federal state using its Treaties, when in others, the different governments make the decisions 
through bargaining. Many have compared the EU as an ‘upside down confederacy’, in which the 
various members hold powers concerning the higher level bodies (for example, defence), while 
the EU deals with the lesser activities (for example, environmental policy). In addition, the EU’s 
authority is usually higher when it comes to adopting and setting the stages of a policy cycle, 
while the states are held back when it comes to their financial resources. Compared to states, 
the EU has a relatively small budget of its own, having no general powers of taxation. This leads 
to certain assumptions. Firstly, the EU has only a few resources of its own and practically none 
in the environmental sector. That means that, to get something done, it has to rely to a 
considerable degree on various regulations. Its ability to use new environmental policy 
instruments (NEPIs) to achieve environmental goals is extremely diluted. Second, the fact that 
the states dominate the implementation of EU regulation, makes the EU itself to try very hard 
to put into effect those policies that were adopted. Thirdly, even within a sector with 
paramount importance such as the environment, the vertical allocation of tasks can sometimes 
be irrational.            
 Given the fact that the motive for the development of EU environmental policies is to 
tackle pollution issues that concern the states, one might expect that most member states 
would deal with sub-national public goods and the EU would focus on cross-border public 
goods. However, some believe that the EU concentrates in imposing regulations concerning 
sub-national public goods like urban air quality and bathing water, while at the same time 
ignores its responsibility to regulate cross-border issues like energy policy. One of the main 
reasons for this situation is the open structure of the EU policy process, which makes it possible 
for different actors to introduce ideas from different directions.     
 The Treaties are the nearest to an EU constitution. The EU has been effectively engaged 
in  a continual constitutional debate about its authorities, due to the fact that these Treaties 
have been improved through time. The Treaties offer a variety of principles and procedures 
which result in environmental policy development. Consecutive Treaty amendments have 
affected greatly the power of various environmental policy actors.    
 The EU environmental policy was already over 25 years old when the subject of the 
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environment was first mentioned in the Treaties. In fact, the closest things that the EU has to a 
draft for environmental policy are the Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs). However, any 
limitations that derive from the Treaties influence directly the selection of environmental policy 
instruments.            
 The fact that the four main EU institutions are implicated in the policy-making process, 
is another proof of the importance of the involvement of the Treaties. As expected, this creates 
a certain level of complexity: the Council of Ministers and the Commission share some 
executive powers and various implementation functions with the member states. 
Comparatively, the Council shares certain traditional functions of legislation as well as liabilities 
with the elected European Parliament (EP) and other national parliaments. The Commission, 
with its many Directorate Generals (DGs), exercises environmental policy and acts as the 
‘guardian of the Treaties’, making sure that member states will comply with the obligations 
made in the Treaties. The Commission’s proposals can only be accepted if they are approved by 
the council of Ministers and the EP respectively. Finally, another major institution of the EU is 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Its role has become to decide the scope of the various 
environmental laws of the EU and how they have to be implemented by member states. 
Normally, the European Council doesn’t get involved in the law-making process although it 
represents the EU’s goals and strategies. Within the Commission, all the DGs (including the 
Environment) should cooperate in order to take proper decisions on environmental policy 
because the College of Commissions decides by common consent on Commission proposals. 
 
Policy style 
 The European policy model contains the terms of regularized access, bargaining and 
consensus. Lately there have been many definitional problems concerning the application of 
the ‘policy style’ concept of the EU. Over the years, many authors developed theories in order 
to compare the different operating procedures of the member states for making and 
implementing policies, leaving out the various sectors. The authors also concluded that if they 
want to examine the ‘policy style’, they would have to rule out the cross-sectoral variation and 
deal with the differences of each nation instead. On the other hand, many debate that the 
operating procedures of the EU are not part of its own policy style but merely a mix of national 
policy styles. Another important fact is that the environment (whose policy we are going to 
explain) is involved in many other sectors (such as transport and energy) and it is in these 
sectors that environmental damage is usually met.      
 By examining thoroughly the EU’s environmental policy, many considerable points 
emerge. As far as the consensual-impositional part is concerned, the EU is often portrayed as a 
federation with diversity and a strong desire to achieve consensus. The EU’s wide range of 
actors (namely the Commission, EP, ECJ, etc) may sometimes object and produce a ‘veto point’. 
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In order to overcome these obstacles and getting the policies adopted, unanimity is required. 
This means that certain ‘veto actors’ have to compromise and as a result reveal their true 
motives. It is difficult to adopt EU policy by imposition-or at least consistent imposition. 
Nevertheless, imposition is sometimes the only way for actors to achieve their objectives. 
When it comes to reaction and anticipation of environmental problems, the EU (especially the 
EP and the Commission) has been a strong defender. Even in the first EAP in 1973 where they 
were integrated. Nowadays, the EU has a Treaty-based commitment to anticipate problems 
related to the environment, through certain precautionary standards. The most recent example 
is the EU’s attitude towards climate change. 
 
Policy goals and strategies 
 Through the years, DG Environment has been trying to find a way for a contextual policy 
to be adopted. This would include concepts like ecological modernization and sustainable 
development. As a result, the various Treaties now contain a  lot of policy principles like 
precaution, anticipation and environmental policy integration.     
 In 2001, the EU adopted a Sustainable Development Strategy. Before that, only a small 
number of laws concerned environmental and/or health issues. The first pieces of 
environmental regulation appeared at the early 70’s. These were mainly focused on radiation 
from the nuclear sector and the labeling of dangerous substances. The structure of EU 
legislation should be referred if the command-and-control regulations are to be established. 
More specifically, primary legislation consists of the Treaties and secondary legislation consists 
of Regulations, Directives and Decisions which are adopted by the EU to apply the provisions of 
the Treaties. The Directives have been a commonly used means of the EU’s environmental 
policy since the 70’s. They define the legally binding goals and commitments but the final 
choice of their implementation rests upon the member states.    
 During the 80’s, there has been a dispute over the efficacy and the economic efficiency 
of the EU environmental regulation. The various members of the industry introduced modern 
tools like voluntary agreements and eco-taxes in order to find cheaper forms of control. In the 
next decade, this argument started becoming part of a greater debate-the one concerning the 
level of authority of member states and the EU. This situation made way for the industry to 
claim new policy instruments. At the same time, certain member states pushed for the 
complete review and revaluation of past EU environmental laws but none of them was revised 
whatsoever.           
 A Commission’s 2001 Paper introduced a more efficient theory concerning new policy 
instruments. It acknowledged that EU legislation is sometimes too elaborated, thus consuming 
time to be reviewed and improved and also that it is seldom fully implemented due to the 
complexity of the negotiation processes. The Commission committed to make better the 
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quality, effectiveness and simplicity of regulatory acts. This regarded: i) the use of regulation as 
a last resort, ii) the increase of framework directives which include only the fundamental parts 
of a policy, excluding any technical details, iii) the introduction of co-regulation which 
concerned the link of regulation with other tools like the voluntary agreements; and iv) the 
extensive use of the open method of co-ordination (OMC), by which member states exchange 
information about the better management and evaluation of their activities.  
 Of course, there are certain boundaries to the application of these four issues. First, 
because the EU remains a regulatory state, it is not completely striking that new environmental 
policy instruments are used to a meager degree throughout the EU. In addition, EU 
environmental policy has become a rather significant section of EU activity and as a result it 
doesn’t fit with softer policy instruments such as the OMC (which primarily involves less 
important areas like employment and social policies). 
 
Informational means 
 In this chapter, we are going to discuss the informational policy instruments and more 
specifically the eco-labels and the environmental management schemes (EMSs). Despite the 
fact that eco-labels and EMSs are considered as two separate schemes, they both share the 
ability to help the participants to revise and make public of their environmental performance. 
Apart from their informational role, both eco-labels and EMSs also act as voluntary policy 
instruments schemes that introduce a self-regulatory process in which the actors abide by 
certain environmental performance preconditions (especially when it comes to eco-label 
schemes) and environmental audits (especially when it comes to EMSs).  
 Informational policy instruments are sometimes characterized as ‘moral oppression 
instruments’ because they communicate to consumers standardised information concerning 
the effects on the environment of various products. Taking advantage of this situation, many 
corporations which are part of markets with public environmental awareness and ecological 
elements, are often motivated to adopt eco-label schemes and/or EMSs especially if their 
antagonists have already done so.        
 The first country which introduced an eco-label scheme was Germany. At the early 90’s 
many other countries along with the EU followed this example. However, the spread of eco-
label schemes didn’t include all of the EU’s member states. In spite of the rise of eco-label 
schemes, the appropriation of EMSs in Europe was characterized by another follower-leader 
pattern. As a result, rivals took place among EU and international EMSs.   
 Eco-label schemes were mainly made to help the consumers to check the environmental 
sustainability of their products. Especially in markets with ‘green consenciousness’, many 
companies choose to adopt eco-labels in order to have a competitive advantage. On the 
contrary, in markets with a lower level of ‘green consenciousness’, eco-labels are often used as 
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a means to raise public environmental awareness.      
 The OECD splits the eco-label schemes into 3 sub-types: Type I – schemes verified by 
third-party institutions, Type II – semi-certified schemes by manufacturers and/or retailers and 
Type III – schemes with unique characteristics based on a specific product’s features. Type I 
eco-label schemes were first established in Europe (specifically in Germany) where they were 
welcomed counter to other member states which were not so receptive. Type II schemes are 
popular among companies although they are not so popular when it comes to implementation. 
Type III schemes are mainly directed towards goods with special features and for this reason 
are not broadly used. Because of these conditions, we are going to primarily focus on Type I 
eco-label schemes.          
 The first EU regulation that introduces eco-management and audit schemes (EMAS) was 
called EMAS I. It describes EMSs as ‘the part of the total management structure and other 
conditions regarding the implementation of environmental policy’. EMAS I started being in 
effect in 1995 and has since been revised twice. EMAS II did in 2001 and EMAS III in 2010. 
 EMSs define the environmental conditions in which companies can commercialize their 
products. The goal is to achieve a constant improvement: all corporations should revise the 
environmental impact of their products and try to meet the specifications of a third party 
environment verifier who will test them impartially. The concept of an EMS comes from the US, 
where certain companies adopted auditing practices in the early 70’s. A raise in industrial 
accidents was noted contrary to the fact that environmental regulation was increasing at the 
time. Because of this situation, the various corporations started auditing themselves to comply 
more easily with the rules. The International Chamber of Commerce issued a document in the 
late 80’s, concerning the environmental auditing. During that period many EU member states 
started welcoming auditing, supporting the ICC’s thesis.     
 EMSs like the EMAS and the International Standard Organisation’s (ISO) 14001 standard 
make corporations aware of their effect on the environment. Despite their differences, both 
schemes try to encourage auditing as well as monitoring and reduction of the environmental 
impact. However, not all companies can be subject to these schemes as they need to meet 
certain requirements. Even though these schemes aren’t obligatory, many companies adopt 
them to show corporal social responsibility. 
 
 
Eco-labels 
 The course of the EU eco-label has been doubtful since its beginning. The Commission 
introduced the first label in 1991. There were conflicts about the matter of coordination and 
control of the EU eco-label by the Commission. The European Parliament was in favor of the 
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participation of various shareholders at all stages of the schemes, while at the same time 
promoting the coexistence of both the EU and national schemes.    
 The actual definition of the EU eco-label scheme is: a scheme that endorses products 
and services that are less harmful for the environment correlating with relevant products and 
services. It is granted for a period of up to 3 years, based on certain conditions concerning the 
kind of each product/service. All applications related to the EU eco-label must be submitted to 
each state’s Competent Body and then carried forward to an Advisory Committee. This 
Committee consists of members from the Competent Bodies which are moderated by the 
Commission. Also, the Committee defines the product groups and qualifications that member 
states should later break down and examine.      
 During the period between 1992 and 1995, the EU eco-label was granted only in two 
firms. In 2000, the number rose to 41 schemes across 15 countries. After a revision in 2000, 
there were approximately 184 EU eco-label schemes but their number was still relatively small.
 A surprising fact concerning the EU eco-label is that many countries which don’t have a 
national eco-label, aren’t very eager to adopt an EU eco-label at all. On the other hand, 
member states which have adopted their own national eco-label schemes, tend to consider 
theirs to be more austere contrary to the EU eco-label which is more diverse. In addition, the 
lower consumer recognition makes companies skeptical about adopting the EU eco-label, as 
they consider it costly and difficult to use.       
 In early 2004, many corporations from various countries (Italy, France, Denmark) 
adopted a huge amount of EU eco-labels. This mainly concerned large companies while small or 
medium companies chose their nation’s eco-labels. The firms which are about to introduce an 
eco-label that isn’t EU’s, will have to face the issue of making the label known to the 
consumers. Simply the fact that a company uses an EU eco-label, can make it extremely 
competitive.           
 In 2001, most EU eco-label licences were granted to: i) tourist accommodation services, 
ii) all-purpose and sanitary cleaners, iii) indoor and outdoor paints. However, the majority of EU 
product groups wasn’t able to be awarded with an eco-label. Especially, the white goods (such 
as fridges) faced the most difficulties despite the fact that they already held energy efficiency 
labels. In addition to the competition with various national schemes, the EU eco-label also 
faced other issues. One of them was that many member states distrusted its decision-making 
process. Another was the difference regarding the fixed charges between the EU eco-label and 
the national schemes. Finally, there were hints that the EU eco-label violated certain WTO 
rules.            
 The Commission concluded that the EU eco-label suffered from: i) low public awareness, 
ii) a small number of product groups, iii) unwieldy procedures, iv) an uneven geographic 
dispersion. As  a result, a revision was proposed.       
 The EU eco-label was revised in 2000 (instead of 1997 when it was initially planned) 
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because of discords between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. The 
Commission was in favor of the abolishment of national schemes while the Council was in favor 
of the co-existence of EU and member state schemes. The newly EU eco-label scheme was 
appointed an Eco-labeling Board which was made up of national Competent Bodies. It was 
characterized by higher consumer involvement and also associated the EU eco-label schemes 
with EMAS.           
 In 2006, the Commission suggested that the EU eco-label and the EMAS should merge in 
order to achieve growth. This didn’t happen and the Commission ultimately praised the EU eco-
label. The companies that had adopted the scheme preferred it because of its performance and 
non-users treated it as a benchmark. The revision of the EU eco-label has a result the higher 
level of absorption by member states. Transparency, lower fees and the improvement of the 
decision-making process led to this admittance. The leading countries which adopted the EU 
eco-label were Germany, Spain, Italy and France. As far as product groups were concerned, 
there was a significant increase in the number of EU eco-label licences for sanitary cleaners, 
tourist accommodation services, textiles and paints. The leading product group was different in 
each country. 
 
Environmental Management Schemes (EMAS) 
The fact that certain countries started adopting their own national environmental 
management schemes had a negative impact on European industrial associations. Many 
considered the EMAS I to be much stricter than other standards (such as Germany’s and UK’s), 
as it constantly reduced the environmental impact and required a closer self-audit. Also, EMAS I 
contained frequent revisions of the environmental targets and let out further information 
about environmental performance.        
 In 1996, the ISO 14001 was adopted. It was much more lenient than the EMAS I as far as 
premises for environmental statement were concerned. As a result, many corporations (both 
European and international) chose to adopt this standard. In 2001, the EU revised EMAS I in 
order to: i) expand its application in other sectors (such as public authorities and NGOs), ii) 
highlight any secondary environmental effects, iii) focus in public reporting. This newly 
reformed EMAS II pointed out the intense ‘rivalry’ of the EMAS I and the ISO 14001. As a matter 
of fact, one of the targets of the revision, was to make EMAS II more similar to the ISO 14001 
without, however, stripping it of its stricter elements.     
 The 2001 revision came into force in 2004. Public companies were now capable of 
taking part in EMAS (not only private) and the application of EMAS expanded in all economic 
sectors. The first organisation which achieved it was the Environment Agency in Germany. 
However, despite of the extension of EMAS, the fulfillment of requirements for industrial sites 
made the ISO 14001 even more popular among countries. Germany holds the dominant 
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position and other countries such as Austria, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands follow. 
 The revision of EMAS II came across with a lot of controversy by certain European 
environmental and consumer groups. They pushed for a better evaluation system when it 
comes to the schemes and also for a more substantial revision overall. Consequently, the 
Commission started trying to improve EMAS in every possible way. Firstly, DG Environment 
came up with ways to link EMAS with the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) 
Directive. In 2007, the idea of a new revision started growing. Three years later, EMAS III 
became operational. EMAS III required all eco-audited organisations to issue a report, ensuring 
that they weren’t breaching any environmental laws. Also, the new scheme introduced one 
single EMAS logo for all products.         
 In 2007, there were almost ten times more ISO 14001 registered organisations than 
EMAS-registered. This led the Commission to a search of ways to increase motivation, by 
allowing non-EU or EU-associated organisations to join. 
 
Voluntary means 
 Voluntary agreements (Vas) are basically commitments from companies that they will 
follow a specific procedure. Although, these agreements are not applied by force, we 
sometimes have a certain degree of necessitation that governmental actors pass on societal 
actors. Vas started being used in the early 70’s, primarily by Germany and the Netherlands. It 
was only after decades that Vas became known among other EU member states. Over the years 
there have been definitions to describe the VAs. The European Environment Agency (EEA) 
defined them as ‘covering only those commitments undertaken by firms and sector 
associations, which are the result of negotiations with public authorities and/or explicitly 
recognized by the authorities’, while the Commission described them as ‘agreements between 
industry and public authorities on the achievement of environmental objectives’.  
 It was during the late 80’s that the EU decided to start adopting Vas. One reason for this 
decision of the environmental policy makers was the increasing competition (as a result of 
globalization). In addition, many new policy issues (such as climate change) started to emerge 
and they couldn’t be dealt with conventional regulatory processes, making Vas indispensable.
 In 2002 there was a proposition for introducing 7 different types of EU-wide VAs. 
However, most of them were overreached as they suggested a Treaty amendment to impose a 
legal base for VAs, while other suggested cross-sectoral collaborations and other EMAS-like 
schemes. As a result, the Commission eventually rejected most of these options (after being 
advised to do so by the Legal Service) because it considered them to be too insubstantial.
 During the same year, a Commission’s statement referred to the need of creating 
additional environmental agreements before 2004. These concerned 4 areas: Polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) management, Integrated Product Policy, climate change and waste management. 
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However, there was still low acceptance of the VAs in the EU due to issues of legality and 
transparency. The EP was strongly against the Commission’s decision to increase the use of VAs 
in the EU, except for the PVC report. Also, there were many environmental groups which 
entertained doubts about the use of VAs. In the same way, European industry backed the 
expansion of EU-wide VAs but didn’t support openly the Commission’s efforts to promote 
them.           
 Competition grew among national VAs and the EU-wide VAs. Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands were the most competitive countries when it came to these agreements. Also, the 
fact that certain free-riders surfaced, led the Commission to the increase of EU-wide VAs. 
Substantially, free-riders were parties who gained a competitive advantage in the market every 
time they couldn’t implement the VAs. This didn’t have any sanctions as the VAs aren’t legally 
binding. Moreover, the Commission noticed that not all industry sectors have their own 
associations, making it difficult to introduce new VAs. Notably, the majority of EU-wide VAs has 
been adopted by the automobile and the chemical industry. The first 4 EU-wide VAs were 
adopted in the late 80’s and they all concerned chemicals. Three of them contained reduction 
targets for Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and the fourth regarded detergents.  
 In 1999, the Commission and the association of the European automobile industry 
(ACEA) arrived at a decision for a VA which would reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions for 
passenger cars. Both the EP and the Council where monitoring the negotiations from the start, 
as they have set the reduction targets. The negotiation lasted for almost 5 years and in the end 
both the Commission and the ACEA characterized this agreement as ‘a great success’. The VA 
fixed the CO2 emission reduction at 140g/km by 2008 but some environmental groups 
considered it to be too scant.         
 In 2004, certain automobile corporations (especially in Germany) started having second 
thoughts about the effectiveness of VAs. They pointed out at the governments of member 
states the level of competition while pushing for less strict CO2 emission reduction targets. Two 
years later, ACEA held the consumers responsible for the failure of the CO2 emissions VA, by 
stating that they choose more fuel efficient vehicles. The Commission, in turn, expressed its 
discontent about the automobile industry’s slow progress and warned that it would substitute 
the VA for a legally binding legislation. In 2007, the Commission, realizing that the emissions 
target wouldn’t be reached by 2012 without extra interference, proposed a binding EU 
legislation. The legislation forced automobile companies to reduce their CO2 emissions from 
new vehicles to 120g/km by 2015. The OECD was also quite skeptical about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of VAs. However, despite the fact that most European companies were 
disappointed by the VAs, the industry in general was in favor of them instead of binding of EU 
legislation.          
 Between 1998 and 2004, only two EU-wide VAs were adopted in addition to the VA on 
CO2 emissions. The first concerned mercury and pesticides and the second biodegradable 
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plastic. Other areas which gained attention for adoption of VAs were: climate change (electrical 
engineering applications), batteries’ components and imaging equipment (such as 
photocopiers).         
 Through the years, VAs have remained an environmental policy option for member 
states. Since the late 90’s, most VAs have been considered as a secondary tool within a wider 
policy mix. VAs along with eco-label schemes, EMSs, eco-taxes and emissions trading constitute 
the main components of the EU strategy.       
 In order to motivate companies to adopt the VAs, the Commission created a 
supplementary framework: the eco-design Directive. This Directive sets certain preconditions 
for products that have an impact on energy consumption. The Commission is free to impose 
various requirements to companies that adopt the eco-design Directive.   
 By 2011 there were only 14 EU-wide VAs. Their number is extremely small if we take 
into consideration that there were hundreds of national VAs across the EU. This ‘unpopularity’ 
of the VAs continues due to various reasons. Some of them are: the lack of a Treaty-based 
character of the VAs, the dispute over their effectiveness by some EU institutions (such as the 
EP) and the overall institutional status of the EU. 
 
Eco-taxes 
 When it comes to environmental governance, market-based instruments have a leading 
position. Certain European countries (especially in the North) have been using eco-taxes since 
the late 70’s, despite the fact that these eco-taxes were based on Pigou’s theoretical work back 
in the 1920’s. Economists throughout the world praise eco-taxes as they point out the costs of 
negative environmental externalities.       
 Energy taxes account for more than 50% of the eco-taxes in the EU, with Germany, 
France and Italy being the leading countries. At first, eco-taxes had the form of a charge on 
specific pollution. However, by the mid-1970’s, certain countries in the north as well as 
Germany, France and the Netherlands, have expanded the use of eco-taxes on water and air 
pollution.           
 By the late 90’s, there is an overall eco-tax reformation. The main reason was to 
increase the cost of the consumption of non-renewable resources or polluting activities while 
using the generated revenue to reduce labor cost. Germany and the Netherlands were once 
more the pioneers.         
 Between 1970 and 1990, merely the thought of using eco-taxes as a supplementary 
environmental policy instrument was absent. Despite the fact that certain member states 
adopted various eco-taxes, traditional regulation continued to be the main EU environmental 
policy tool. It was only during the end of the 80’s that eco-taxes for carbon dioxide were first 
introduced by the DG Environment. One of the main reasons was of course global warming and 
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the greenhouse effect. Public awareness within the member states led to the development of 
alternative environmental policy instruments.      
 In 1992 the members of the DG Environment concluded that they should emphasize on 
a common carbon dioxide/energy tax. The same year, in the UN Rio Earth Summit, it was 
stressed that eco-taxes would help the EU boost its global role and broaden the Commission’s 
scope of influence. While some countries (such as Germany and the Netherlands) backed EU’s 
decision for an eco-tax, there were many that opposed to the idea for their own speculative 
reasons. However, EU was still unable to create a proper eco-tax. As a result, a group of like-
minded countries started discussing the characteristics of national eco-taxes and the 
requirements for a united carbon dioxide/energy tax.     
 In 1997, a Directive was introduced by the Commission in order to align member states’ 
taxation on energy products. Although there were reactions, in the end member states came to 
an agreement regarding certain basic principles. In 2003, the Finance Ministers finally agreed 
on a framework directive that included various economic sectors. The EP, having doubts about 
the effectiveness of the Directive, proposed a revision but the Commission rejected it. On 27 
October 2003, the Economic and Finance Minister Council (ECOFIN) formally adopted the 
Energy Tax Directive (2003/96/EC). The Directive included tax measures for energy products 
such as coal, natural gas and electricity.       
 Having successfully introduced the Energy Tax Directive, the Commission tried to find 
ways to improve it. One of them was the suggestion of an eco-tax on passenger cars. Member 
states were bound that by 2010 at least 50% of passenger car taxes would be proportionate to 
the CO2 emissions. Moreover, the Commission tried to introduce a CO2 tax on imports from 
third party countries which couldn’t meet the requirements for greenhouse gas emissions, but 
most member states voted against it.       
 In 2009, a revision was planned by the DG for taxation, in order to conform the Directive 
with the EU’s climate and energy objectives. This revision would eventually concern fue ls for 
cars and heating and electricity production. 
 
 
Emissions trading 
 The principle idea behind emissions trading is relatively simple and universal to all 
emission trading schemes (ETS). States and/or corporations are provided with emission 
‘allowances’ which can be traded in the market place. Naturally, all ETS have differences 
depending, for example, on their cost (some are free while other are sold through auctions). 
The cap-and-trade ETS sets the limit of the emission that states and/or corporations are 
allowed to release while the market sets the price of these ‘permits’. In theory, there is an 
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upper/lower limit for the price of emission allowances but in practice none of the existing ETS 
uses one.           
 The amount of the emission allowances that are granted (supply) affects directly their 
price through scarcity. As a result, states and/or companies are compelled to reduce their 
emissions. This way, new emission reduction technologies emerge as competition among 
parties increases.          
 The idea of emissions trading was first introduced in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The 
Commission, disappointed by its incompetence to introduce a proper carbon dioxide/energy 
tax without flaws, tried to introduce a more cost-efficient market-based instrument. Several DG 
Environment officials came up with the idea of endorsing emissions trading in order to tackle 
climate change. In 2000, the Commission published a Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading within the EU. After consulting various member governments, the Commission 
ultimately issued an EU ETS proposal in 2001. Two years later, both the EP and the 
Environmental Council adopted the proposal after laborious negotiations. At first, the EP 
proposed approximately 60 amendments to improve the efficiency of the scheme and later 14 
more were added.          
 The focus of the EP and the Environmental Council shifted towards the structure of the 
scheme and not towards technicalities. Each member state has to implement its own rules 
regarding the function of schemes which were called national allocation plans (NAPs). As a 
result, the EU ETS became a highly decentralized scheme and many countries chose not to 
follow the Commission’s instructions. It was this situation that led to the quick adoption of the 
Commission’s proposal. Also, it was imperative to introduce a functioning EU ETS before the 
Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 and thus the Environmental Council and the EP 
consented to it right away.         
 In 2003 the Commission proposed a so-called linking directive. It connected the EU ETS 
with certain mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol, namely the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and joint implementation (JI). The CDM grants developed countries the emission 
reduction units (ERUs), which can be traded within the EU ETS, for sponsoring certified 
greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries. JI allows developed 
countries (listed in Kyoto Protocol) to implement jointly greenhouse gas emission reduction 
projects.           
 In 2005, the EU ETS came into force. It was applied in approximately 10.000 sites in the 
energy and industrial sectors which account for almost 50% of Europe’s emissions of CO2. The 
EU ETS is divided into 2 trading phases: the first from 2005-2007 and the second from 2008-
2012. During the first phase, the main pillars were set up and during the second, which was also 
Kyoto Protocol’s first trading phase, there was a refinement of the rules. A third trading phase 
(2013-2020) was added during the revision of the EU ETS.    
 Germany had the majority of its sites covered by the EU ETS, since it had the highest 
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levels of CO2 emissions in the EU. Almost 60% of these emissions were covered by the EU ETS. 
Also, almost 50% of its emission allowances were used by the 4 largest energy producers. Other 
countries with corporations which used emission allowances were Austria and the Netherlands.
 During the two trading phases, countries had to implement NAPs which set limits 
regarding the CO2 emissions in order for them to converge with the Kyoto Protocol reduction 
target. Naturally, each member state had different reduction targets, depending on its capacity.
 In the Netherlands, the government was getting ready for the introduction of the EU ETS 
with the Dutch Emissions Authority (NEA) being responsible for its implementation. NEA was in 
charge of monitoring the procedures and of making sure that everything would function by due 
process. Also, NEA issued annual emission monitoring reports and sanctioned firms’ protocols. 
In its first year (2005), NEA had already granted almost 200 allowances which accounted for 
95% of the country’s industry. In the end, the EU ETS was implemented by the Environment and 
Economics Ministries. In addition, the Ministry of Finance dealt with issues of auctioning and 
the income that derived from it.        
 In Germany the NAP-I (NAP of the first trading phase) was introduced in 2004 and was 
approved by the Commission the same year. Because of the political instability of that time, 
many firms showed their opposition to the EU ETS by taking legal action against it. However, 
the courts largely backed the government’s position. The German NAP-I was extremely 
complex-it contained almost different provisions for distributing allowances. That was mainly 
because Germany had the largest number of sites (from a variety of industrial sectors) which 
used the EU ETS. In addition, Germany has always been an ambitious country when it came to 
reduction targets. The NAP-I was fully integrated as it blended successfully with all the previous 
laws and environmental policy instruments.       
 In 2004 there was a dispute between the Environment and Economics Ministries about 
the actual function of the NAP-I. However, after negotiations, all parties came to an agreement 
to set the cap at 503 million tons. Also, after the negotiations, the carbon dioxide coal industry 
was benefited with new allocation rules.       
 The price for emissions allowances was low during much of the first trading phase. In 
2006, the results showed that the CO2 emissions which were released, were disproportionate 
compared to the number of allowances that were granted. As a result, the price of the 
allowances fell to about one third of the initial price. One year later, the price declined 
markedly (less than 1 euro/ton). In the end of the first phase, the Commission concluded that it 
was overall an educational period which taught many things to countries.   
 In 2007 the second trading phase was initiated and was marked by the implementation 
of the EU ETS. In Germany, the NAP-II was introduced and it contained an auctioning of 7% of 
the national CO2 emission allowances. After the elections in 2005 there was a slight dispute 
between the Economics and Environment Ministries concerning the emissions trading. Many 
government officials pushed for a 10% auctioning option but in the end, a compromise was 
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reached at 8,8 %.          
 The NAP-II in Germany set the limit at around 480 million tons for carbon dioxide 
emissions but the Commission refused to accept it because it deviated from the Kyoto Protocol 
reduction target. The Economics Ministry wanted to file a complaint to the Commission but 
eventually the government accepted it. This happened for two reasons. First, a legal challenge 
would have created uncertainty for German industry and second, Germany wanted to be a 
reliable and reputable member state of the EU.      
 In the Netherlands, there were difficulties in the implementation of the EU ETS. The 
Dutch Court of Audit considered that the NAP-II was not very effective when it came to CO2  
emission reduction and that it would sabotage the government’s commitment to the Kyoto 
Protocol. As a result, the Commission urged the government to implement a stricter NAP-II cap. 
The same happened with 9 other member states-the Commission requested an average 
reduction of emissions of around 7%.       
 The European Environmental Agency detected many member states differences during 
the implementation of the EU ETS. Consequently, it pushed for an increased harmonization of 
the EU ETS by easing the demands of the Emission Trading Directive.   
 In 2008 the aviation sector was added to the EU ETS through a Directive (2008/101/EC) 
introduced by the Council and EP. Moreover, the Commission tried to establish a way to include 
the shipping industry. Despite the fact that there were objections for the use of the Directive by 
countries like China and USA, in the end the ECJ decided that it was in accordance with EU 
legislation.           
 During the third trading phase (2013-2020) the EU ETS was revised in order to fix certain 
flaws of the rules of the first two trading phases. Almost all member states faced the fact that 
the EU ETS should become more centralized with more coordinated procedures. The most 
important points of the revision were: i) the use of a single EU-wide cap, ii) the auctioning 
process will become the main allocation method for allowances, iii) benchmarking for industrial 
sectors will be introduced, iv) the rules for Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Mechanism will be present in the new Directive.     
 Between 2009 and 2011, the EU ETS has fallen victim to several attacks by criminal 
hackers. In these years, many millions were stolen and the tax authorities were defrauded 
many times. In order to ensure the functioning of the market-based EU ETS, state authorities 
had to crack down on fraudsters. 
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Renewable energy support mechanisms 
 In recent years, renewable energy sources (RES) have gained a lot of importance around 
the globe. The technologies which are connected with RES are evolving rapidly and occupy a 
dominant position in energy generation. In fact, only in 2009, almost 60% of newly installed 
capacity in Europe came from RES. The Commission has already set certain targets for the use 
of RES. The Directive 2009/28/EC dictates mandatory national targets which account for a 20% 
of energy from renewable sources and a 10% of energy from renewable sources in transport by 
2020.            
 RES are about to play an even more important role in the EU’s environmental policy. 
Many member states have already begun incorporating RES in their energy generation 
procedure. For example, Denmark announced in 2011 that more than half of its electricity 
production will come from RES while Germany has set a target of 35% for RES use concerning 
its electricity consumption.        
 However, the high cost of integrating RES technology has raised many concerns and has 
resulted in the need for regulatory intervention. Member states’ governments and regulatory 
agencies are trying to create the proper framework in order to control the integration of RES 
technologies into the larger generation mix. Naturally, there is a dispute for the use of RES 
support schemes and the existing industrial frameworks. In practice, the biggest challenge is to 
replace previous polluting technologies with RES technologies and of course their cost.  These 
and some other issues pose the question of how the RES are going to be properly exploited and 
supported financially by states,          
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Price-based mechanisms 
 
Feed-in-tariffs 
Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) are increasingly becoming a very effective policy model for the 
better development of renewable energy sources. Nowadays, they are integrated in almost 70 
legal frameworks in the EU as they offer a more efficient and cheaper supply of renewable 
energy than the traditional policy schemes.       
 The basic feature of FITs is to guarantee RES for electricity generators a fixed price per 
MWh for a specific period of time. Naturally, the prices vary depending on the size of 
installations, the location, the type of technology that is used and of course the quantity of the 
energy source. As there are so many factors that affect the price, there are also many ‘players’ 
that involve in the process. Homeowners, landowners as well as small business owners all have 
a role in the integration of new technologies regarding energy sources.   
 In countries where FITs have been applied successfully, the amount of schemes that 
finance certain projects is determined based on the generation costs. Such countries are 
Germany, Denmark, Spain and Portugal. In particular, FITs facilitate the cheaper development 
of renewable energy installations.        
 By guaranteeing to cover the costs for the development of renewable energy schemes 
and ensuring that the financing will last for the lifetime of the technology, FITs are definitely an 
effective way to avoid investment risks and therefore contribute to rapid market growth. This 
way there is a high level of security over cash flows which is important especially for projects 
with high operating costs. The assurance that the FIT financing will cover project costs is 
essential and still remains one of the biggest challenges of a successful FIT policy.   
 Apart from making sure that the FIT payments will be sufficient to cover the costs, this 
particular support mechanism contributes to the overall boost of investors’ confidence. As the 
issue of climate change gains high attention over the years, renewable energy is constantly 
developing to meet the challenges. Consequently, the various FIT policies will be broadly used 
as a policy option to drive RE development.       
 FITs have adopted certain rules regarding their function: 
i) Sometimes the FIT acts as an add-on within an existing regulation 
ii) The cost of RES development can differ based on each technology (solar 
power, wind power, biomass, etc) and on other factors such as location and scale. As a 
result, governments often offer ‘flat’ tariffs which vary depending on several conditions. 
The goal of ‘flat’ tariffs is to reduce the cost for consumers and distribute the financing 
more efficiently. However, despite their ‘fairness’, ‘flat’ tariffs appear to sabotage the 
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market – they distribute equally the financing to all technologies and as a result make it 
difficult for each technology to stand out. 
iii) The payment through FITs can be constant or dwindling. In the second 
case, the payment stays constant for the first years of operation and then it is 
decreasing gradually. 
Guaranteed financing from feed-in-tariffs actually reassures RES developers who are not 
endangered by risks related to the market prices anymore. Also, the developers are not 
involved in certificate trading (like in RPS), since the competition among the providers is 
eliminated at this area. The FIT mechanism is suitable for energy companies which have 
transcended the stage of Research&Development but they lack market maturity and a strong 
presence in the system. In many countries, the fact that energy technologies can be supported 
by FITs, had a reverse effect. The over-financing of one technology (for example, wind 
turbines), made it difficult for the technological innovations to stay on course with the 
regulatory framework.         
 Another major advantage of FITs is that they ease the administrative tasks of each 
regulatory authority. In addition, they diminish any limitation for every RES generator or 
investor who wishes to enter the market. In general, feed-in-tariffs decrease competition 
between conventional energy generators and RES generators by counterbalancing the ‘playing’ 
field.            
 The most obvious disadvantage of feed-in-tariffs is of course how to properly allocate 
the financing to RES generators. In reality, the regulator who authorizes the FIT, usually isn’t 
aware of the financial state of the generators. As a result, there is a risk that the FIT will be too 
high or too low and affect the energy production respectively. This happens especially to 
technologies which have similar deployment costs.      
 The fact that remuneration from FITs is guaranteed, makes some renewable energy 
generators less motivated when it comes to adapting to price changes in the system or when 
there are imbalances between demand and supply. All technologies are affected by this 
situation and only a few (such as hydro and biomass) are able to adapt to these price variations 
properly. Finally, another factor that should be taken into consideration is that the FIT 
mechanism is vulnerable to any regulatory risks. Unfortunately, feed-in-tariffs can be altered or 
even cancelled, depending on the political preferences of the time. 
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Tax incentives 
 Many EU member states choose tax exemption as a fiscal incentive to promote the use 
of renewable energy sources. This policy includes all stages of power generation-from the 
investment to the production and consumption of energy. In general, many policies like this 
have been introducing renewable energy sources use to the market, by applying tax credits. In 
addition, a tax policy contributes to the reduction of fossil fuels. The fact that certain 
governments impose such taxes for vehicles with a higher level of fossil fuels usage, may 
encourage many users to turn to ‘greener’ vehicles and renewable energy sources. More 
specifically, a carbon tax could affect the demand of RES energy.    
 Some member states use tax credits as a complementary RES support mechanism. In 
Germany, for example, conventional energy sources used to be more competitive than RES. 
However, with the imposition of the tax exemption for RES (such as biomass), their sales saw a 
dramatic increase. This plan was also used for electric vehicles (EVs), exempting them from the 
united vehicle tax for 5 years. An important advantage of this plan is that it makes cash 
available. As a result, it could be a useful benchmark for potential investors and also a way to 
make relatively small investments as it increases investor liquidity. It is generally believed that 
the imposition of a carbon emission tax is an effective way to control the level of emissions and 
their cost.           
 The fiscal incentives have a major drawback-they are mostly beneficial from an equity 
aspect. That means that tax credits and various other incentives usually advantage investors 
who have a substantial percentage of their turnover based on RES. Naturally, many RES 
developers choose to enter into tax-oriented partnerships and joint ventures with firms which 
benefit from these fiscal incentives.        
 In addition, investors should take into consideration that the facilitation of an 
investment through a fiscal incentive, doesn’t always mean an increase in production. Finally, it 
should be noted that like all mechanisms, the tax incentives can be subject to each 
government’s regulatory adjustments as well. 
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Quantity-based mechanisms 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 The renewable portfolio standard (RPS) is one of the most common policies used with 
feed-in-tariffs. Contrary to the FIT policy, which is price-based, the RPS is quantity based. This 
mechanism obligates companies to increase the amount of power which is generated by RES. In 
particular, it binds them to generate a fixed share of electricity by renewable energy. As a 
reward, these companies receive tradable green certificates (TGCs) for every unit of power that 
they produce. Contrary to the feed-in-tariff scheme, in which the government participates in 
the whole process, the RPS mechanism concerns the private sector. As a result, there is a higher 
level of price competition among various types of renewable energy technologies. By 2010, RPS 
was implemented in around 50 countries (including more than half of US states). The RPS 
mechanism is often associated with the certificate trading mechanism. In some countries, a 
credit multiplier is used in order to endorse different types of renewable energy technology. 
This way, governments can monitor revenue, investment and job creation to a specific type of 
technology. Over the years, the EU had experience with both FIT and RPS support schemes. 
Nevertheless, the FIT policy has benefited more the expansion of renewable energy and thus 
has been used broadly. The fact that many RPS schemes were so successful and effective in the 
EU (especially in Germany) made them popular in the US as well.    
 Many policy makers disputed over the function of RPS. Some argued that the RPS should 
not be seen as a stand-alone scheme that would promote renewable energy. However, the 
effectiveness of the RPS makes it the perfect starting point for the introduction of an 
international trading system. Others have deduced that the RPS mostly addresses to generators 
instead of end users. Finally, some policy makers stated that even the fact that both FIT and RPS 
mechanisms can co-exist in a regulatory framework, they cannot be compared due to their 
different purposes. The FIT scheme is more suitable for the development of renewable energy 
and its industry, while the RPS concerns market competitiveness and ‘players’.   
 RPS is implemented by certain rules: 
i) In some countries there is a penalty regarding the non-compliance to the 
rules of the policy. In order to ensure the compliance, a penalty is set (usually bigger 
than the actual certificate price) and its revenues pass on to RES generators. 
ii) There is a distinction when it comes to the choice of RES technologies. 
The objective is to achieve a complete development of RES by providing higher levels of 
support for higher cost technologies while decreasing the support for lower cost 
technologies. Most of the times, the support has the form of tradable certificates. For 
example, geothermal energy projects will receive more certificates per MWh than wind. 
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iii) Certain states obligate companies to use the RPS mechanism for their RES 
through long-term contracts. Also, a minimum price is set for the certificates in order to 
ensure basic revenues for the RES electricity producers. 
In addition, there are discussions about awarding renewable energy generating units 
with ‘clean energy certificates’ which will depend on their efficiency and levels of greenhouse 
gas emissions. For example, this could be implemented to wind generators which are ‘greener’ 
than their counterpart gas turbines and thus receive more certificates. This scheme could 
actually be similar to the emissions trading mechanism as it concerns the allocation of carbon 
emission certificates.            
 One of the major advantages of renewable portfolio standards and other similar 
quantity-based mechanisms is that if they function properly, they are extremely thrifty for RES 
power generation. The fact that a target percentage is decided for RES, improves the 
competition among renewable energy developers and the negotiation of the energy prices. 
Also, the awarding of certificates endorses overall efficiency and helps renewable energy 
generators to meet government targets. Trading can take place across different geographical 
areas and systems, thus increasing the transnational and transtate efficiencies. Finally, another 
benefit of RPS is that the cost of the financing is less observable, since it is a part of the final 
energy price.           
 One of the main disadvantages of RPS is that RES suppliers are exposed to 2 types of 
market risk. The first has to do with the variance of energy prices in the wholesale market; 
almost everyone is exposed to this risk. The second concerns trading and the quantity of 
certificates. If they are too many, their price falls while further exposing the market ‘players’. 
The only way to minimize this risk is if the investors commit to maintain their long-term 
contracts with the RES developers (while at the same time are bound by quotas).  
 In addition, for a scheme like this to be successful, it is necessary for the mechanism to 
ensure the state’s regulator about the transparency of the whole process. This should be 
applied especially to systems in which the retail market has not been completely defused.
 Contrary to schemes such as ‘stepped’ tariffs, RPS are usually the same for all energy 
technologies. Consequently, most energy generators and investors will choose the less costly 
technologies of the market which meet the RPS targets. To cope with this situation, many 
countries have created motives for using a mix of energy technologies. Another solution is to 
define mandatory quotas for various RES technologies (for example, wind/biomass/solar).
 RPS can motivate conventional energy generators to include RES into their agenda and 
thus achieve vertical integration. Naturally, this could result in obstruction in the admission of 
new participants and also in increased market power for large players.   
 In some countries, if conventional energy generators fail to meet the RPS targets which 
are set, a penalty is imposed. The revenue from these penalties are channeled to the existing 
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renewable energy generating units. In fact, the cost of the penalties eventually burdens the 
final users (energy consumers) and not the generators, thus making RPS similar to FITs. 
 
Cross-national incentive policies 
 Cross-national incentive policies are related to various mechanisms such as the 
interchange of climate change mitigation technologies, emission trading (ET) and the clean 
development mechanism (CDM) which was introduced by the Kyoto Protocol. Since it is too 
difficult to eliminate GHG emissions permanently, member states are often unable to create 
their own environmentally friendly technologies. As a result, the World Bank and the OECD 
have been trying to eliminate any barriers concerning the trading of such technologies. Each 
country’s technology importers should adjust their policies in order to make the incorporation 
of the climate change mitigation technologies which come from OECD countries easier. 
 The Kyoto Protocol introduced 3 schemes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: i) 
emissions trading (ET), ii) clean development mechanism (CDM) and iii) joint implementation 
(JI). The ET scheme is about the trading of emission allowances between countries. In fact, the 
European Union Emission Trading Scheme is an essential part of the EU environmental policy. In 
recent years, the EU has been trying to harmonize all of the RES support schemes in order to 
expedite the process of allowances trading across member states. When it comes to the CDM 
or the JI mechanism, revenues and carbon credits are the currency. Through carbon credits the 
host countries receive many foreign investments. 
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Conclusion 
 The various adoption patterns of eco-label schemes and EMAS that have been 
examined, showcase the EU environmental policy and its characteristics. The Netherlands 
which has always been a pioneer in environmental projects, has shown little interest for its own 
national eco-label scheme. Instead, Dutch companies preferred the ISO 14001 and not the 
EMAS. In Germany, despite the fact that EMAS I was not very popular at first, it is now adopted 
by most of the country’s companies. Also, since the 2000s, there has been an increase in the 
adoption of the ISO standard and a decrease of the EMAS. In Austria, there is the highest 
number of EMAS registrations per capita. However, many companies are still opposed to this 
scheme whereas they praise the ISO 14001. In general, both the Dutch and the Austrian 
national eco-labels have not achieved significant market presence and/or consumer 
recognition. The same can be said about the EU eco-label scheme too.   
 Both EMAS and ISO 14001 have a significant presence in European business 
management. In particular, the ISO’s 14001 registrations have exceeded EMAS registrations 
even in Germany and Austria where EMAS held a leading position. One reason of this disparity 
is Europe’s shift towards a more lenient environmental governance (from EMAS to ISO 14001). 
However, this shift doesn’t give a complete picture about the various environmental policy 
instruments which operate in the environmental sector. Eco-labels play an equally important 
role in countries such as Austria and the Netherlands. Even in Germany they sometimes replace 
the traditional national schemes. On the other hand, EMAS (I-III) certification increases in both 
Austria and Germany despite the popularity of the ISO 14001.    
 In the EU, where more environmentally concerned member states exist, the EMAS was 
introduced as a stricter policy. This was to some extent, based on the characteristics of the 
market and energy companies. Germany, which has always been a member state with 
ambitious environmental standards, was against the adoption of EMAS I while endorsing an EU 
eco-management scheme that better represented its own environmental priorities. This EU 
EMS represented a strong decision-making input of member states, hoping to make EMAS more 
suitable for companies.        
 Although Germany came up with the idea of a national eco-label scheme, Austria, the 
Netherlands and the EU all adopted the general principle of the eco-label for their own policies. 
This case of ‘policy transfer’ is also a case of policy learning. In particular, Austria tried to 
simulate Germany’s national eco-label scheme, ridding it from its weaknesses. This procedure 
of learning from positive and negative aspects of a policy, was very useful during the adoption 
phase of Austria’s national scheme. The EU eco-label on the other hand, was created by 
observing the market and the competition among national eco-label schemes. The Netherlands 
was actually on the same track as Austria. However, its eco-label was prioritizing on the 
environment and market presence (contrary to Germany’s scheme). 
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 During the early 1990s, almost 60% of all VAs adopted in the EU were found in Germany 
and the Netherlands. In fact, the rest of the member states have only adopted 12. By 2002, 
Germany and the Netherlands increased the amount of their VAs while other countries started 
to adopt them too. However, the role of the VAs has not been the same everywhere. In the 
Netherlands, they were considered legally binding contracts between private and public 
entities, whereas in Austria and Germany, they were non-binding and seen as the final step 
before actual regulation.         
 The overall use of VAs across the EU raised certain doubts. Not all countries fully 
incorporated them to their environmental governance. In particular, many VAs usually co-
existed along with other policy instruments as part of policy instrument mixes. For example, the 
replacement of the VA on carbon-dioxide emission from vehicles with a regulation and the 2020 
energy package. Nevertheless, VAs cannot be said to substituting the conventional 
governments schemes both in the Netherlands and Germany. Certain companies chose to 
adopt them in order to avoid the severity of legislation. VAs have only some of the basic 
features of an environmental governance which rely on horizontal self-coordination tools. This 
is because they have a binding character and more directive too. We should have expected to 
see an increase in the adoption of VAs across the EU, if there have been a shift from 
conventional tools of government towards new soft policy instruments. Although governments 
expected to see a rise in these voluntary agreements, there have been certain obstacles which 
prevented this.          
 In some member states, constitutional constraints prevented the adoption of legally 
binding VAs. Despite the fact that the trend of a national policy had a dominant position, we 
would expect that VAs would be an attractive alternative to environmental regulation. 
However, empirical evidence suggests otherwise. To a considerable extent, institutional factors 
are affecting the adoption and use of VAs. In particular, the EU has an extremely unstable 
political environment upon which to build strong VAs. This lack of a clear constitutional basis as 
well as the uncertainty of who actually negotiates VAs in a legitimate manner, all act as a 
constraint on their adoption. An example of how government parties affect the adoption of VAs 
can be found in all three pioneers of environmental policy, namely Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands. Center-right governments considered VAs a tool against globalization and 
competition while center-left parties were less receptive. Various changes in these coalitions 
have led the subject of the environment to become a priority, as it is related to VAs. In general, 
VAs have not replaced traditional mechanisms of member states but they have been an 
addition in the existing regulation.        
 In the Netherlands, climate change raised people’s awareness and initiated a state-
society interaction concerning environmental governing. Dutch policy makers moved from 
minor agreements to more transparent sector-wide treaties. The increased level of VA adoption 
in Germany and the Netherlands may have inspired Austria and the EU to take VAs into 
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consideration. However, little policy instrument emulation has actually happened across 
jurisdictions. The pioneer countries may have helped the VAs to become more popular and 
under no circumstances this can be considered policy transfer. 
 Over the years there has been an increase in the use of eco-taxes (although it has taken 
place at different periods) in the leading countries (Germany, Austria and the Netherlands). It 
was in the 70s that the EU started adopting eco-taxes, almost 60 years after the UK. However, 
the EU failed to adopt effective EU-wide eco-taxes and at first national eco-taxes were used 
almost exclusively, with Germany and the Netherlands being in the dominant position. What 
has followed is a reformation of policy instruments. According to some experts, there have 
been indications of policy learning, especially in cases where full scale ecological tax reform 
took place. In the EU, the eco-taxes’ evolution has been relatively low as the obstacle of 
unanimity was not surpassed. Altogether, member states and the EU weren’t able to achieve a 
radical ecological reform although they tried.      
 During the 90’s, the Netherlands has been undoubtedly the most effective in adopting 
eco-taxes. Germany applied an eco-tax recalibration in the same decade as well as a number of 
additional eco-taxes some years later. On the other hand, Austria adopted more modest eco-
taxes in a limited range of sectors.         
 There is wide variation in the type of eco-taxes that were adopted by member states. 
The Dutch eco-taxes transformed from being environmental charges to more general eco-taxes. 
German eco-taxes did not evolve so radically. In Austria, a Commission was created, responsible 
for a tax reformation but this never happened in practice. In addition, Germany and the 
Netherlands introduced eco-taxes which were linked to a reduction in labor costs (such as 
national insurance and pension contribution) but Austria failed to do the same.  
 The notion of policy learning in the case of eco-taxes derives from the shift towards 
general taxation as well as the use of environmental tax revenue to reduce labor costs. There is 
not much empirical evidence for direct policy transfer. The leading member states operated 
based their actions on their political status and each interest group, although international 
competition also greatly affected their environmental policy. In addition, many member states 
decided to follow the path set by the pioneers regarding eco-taxes. The OECD’s benchmarking 
process was used by organisations to push for the adoption of eco-taxes and by national 
Environment Agencies to defend eco-tax proposals. Finally, government changes played an 
important role in the reformation of eco-taxes. Government parties in the Netherlands and 
Germany actually applied the revisions. In Austria, the grand coalition didn’t follow. Due to the 
large number of parties across the EU, it is difficult to fully analyze the countries’ intentions of 
adopting eco-taxes. 
 Emissions trading have only been used as a policy instrument in Europe since the 1990s. 
Only a few countries chose to adopt emissions trading before the introduction of the EU ETS in 
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2005. Since 1997, with its ‘birth’ by the Kyoto Protocol, emission trading has become a useful 
instrument for EU member states. At first there has been a dispute about the process of 
emissions trading as policy transfer. This notion was based on the example of NEPIs, which 
were spread by pioneer countries through a global diffusion process. Nevertheless, the 
insertion of emissions trading into the Kyoto Protocol was somehow imposed by the US, 
according to some experts. Naturally, the rules of the EU ETS were very different compared to 
American schemes. The main cause of these differences is different institutional contexts. 
            
 The introduction of emissions trading in Europe faced many obstacles. Firstly, the 
preference for other environmental policy instruments, interests of societal actors and a lack of 
expertise amongst policy makers. Also, environmental NGOs and corporations were opposed to 
emissions trading at first. On the other hand, some of the endorsers were energy companies 
and the banking sector.         
 The Dutch were the first who have used concepts similar to emissions trading (such as 
tradable allowances) since the early 80’s. The first national ETSs had many defects and in the 
1998 Dutch policy makers started designing a better ETS which was introduced the same year 
as the EU ETS. The Netherlands played a very important role in the early stages of the EU ETS 
despite the fact that it later faced difficulties with its implementation when the Commission 
considered the Dutch NAPs to be too soft.       
 The EU ETS became operational in 2005 and it was divided into 3 phases (2005-2007, 
2008-1012, 2013-2020: revision). It was the result of the Commission’s inability to create a 
proper CO2/energy tax proposal. In its introduction in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the idea of ETS 
was supported by the majority of member states and the European Parliament. Germany, 
which was against its adoption at first, eventually supported it in 2002.  
 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the EU ETS is a market-based instrument, it needs 
traditional tools of government. This was observed especially during the setting up period when 
the need for EU and member state laws and institutional structure was obvious. It is often 
misconceived that market-based instruments reduce bureaucracy and legislation. However, the 
market needs government protection. The EU ETS is protected from fraud and corruption by 
top-down state authority. Another factor that played a significant role in the adoption of the EU 
ETS is the various corporations. Finally, due to the complexity of emissions trading, every 
country assigned stakeholders, advisors and policy consultants to discuss the different ETS 
designs.           
 Areas like investment risks and renewable energy employment are highly affected by 
the various structures of FIT payments. While fixed price policies can alleviate investment risks, 
premium price policies offer incentives to companies to produce energy when it is needed the 
most. This way, the supply pressure is reduced and at the same time the integration of 
renewable energy into the market is improved. Revenues from energy projects can also be 
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‘protected’ thanks to certain additional design options like inflation adjustment. As a result, 
investment security is guaranteed and there is a higher number of investors who are willing to 
participate in renewable energy projects. In addition, market-independent FIT schemes include 
a purchase obligation which facilitates the entry into the market and decreases the transaction 
costs. This fixed price option is usually preferred by smaller investors and community-based 
projects.            
 Finally, it should be noted that regardless of each regulatory design, RES support 
schemes play a significant role in the complete energy model and as a result they should 
involve an efficient approach to cost-sharing. Nowadays, all countries around the world are in 
need of renewable energy, not only for the transport and power industries but for the entire 
economy. This need, along with concerns about climate change and political sensitivity to 
increasing energy and fuel rates, has highlighted the importance of energy tariff design as a 
critical component of RES and energy system regulation.  The better the methodology 
for distributing the costs from the schemes, the smaller is the risk of public dissatisfaction and 
hence the larger the amount of total RES that can be developed. The fact that RES targets 
address to all types of energy supplies, means that the cost of the grants will be allocated to 
final energy consumers in direct proportion to their energy consumption and regardless of the 
type of final energy consumed. 
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